

# CHEP 2007

## Addressing the Pilot Security Problem With gLExec

by

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in collaboration with


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# Security in the Grid

Gatekeepers decide who to let in



Each user runs in a different sandbox

# Pilots and the Grid <sup>(1)</sup>

Gatekeepers know only about the pilots


Pilots decide what jobs to run



VO pilot factory

VO Queue

Pilots and all users run sharing the same local identity



# Pilots and the Grid<sup>(2)</sup>

Gatekeepers know only about the pilots

**Pilots decide what jobs to run**




VO pilot factory


VO Queue



Pilots and all users run sharing the same local identity



**Pilots may run jobs from unwanted users**




**OK for sites that trust the VO as a whole but some sites need finer grained control**

# Pilots and the Grid<sup>(3)</sup>

Gatekeepers know only about the pilots

Pilots decide what jobs to run




**Pilots and all users run sharing the same local identity**

# Pilots and the Grid<sup>(4)</sup>


- Pilots can be a problem for both the Grid sites and pilot owners
- Grid sites
  - Who is running
  - Who to hold accountable
  - Reject jobs from unwanted users
- Pilot owners
  - Protect its infrastructure from malicious users
  - Protect users from each other
  - Avoid being held accountable for user's actions

# The (simplified) life of a pilot job




# Introducing gLExec

- A x509 aware (apache) suExec equivalent
- Given a proxy and a binary
  - authenticates and authorizes
  - changes UID/GID
  - executes the binary
- Necessarily owned by root and suid-ed
  - **Not a daemon**




# Pilots with gLExec<sup>(1)</sup>

Sites decide who to let run




# Pilots with gLExec<sup>(2)</sup>

Sites decide who to let run



# The need for centralized authorization

- With gLExec used by Pilots, sites can have thousands of decision points
  - A centralized authorization infrastructure helps keep consistency
- Open Science Grid (OSG) has GUMS/PRIMA
  - A PRIMA gLExec module exists




# gLExec deployment @ Fermilab

- The PRIMA plugin for gLExec was jointly developed by the NIKHEF and Fermilab groups
- Fermilab was the first OSG site to install gLExec on the worker nodes
  - First release in Oct'06
  - Current release deployed in May'07

# gLExec/GUMS @ Fermilab

- gLExec deployed and used on more than 500 nodes
  - Primary user is CDF
- GUMS shown to be very scalable
  - Routinely handling more than 500k requests per day
  - gLExec contributing for at most 20k



# gLExec in OSG

- gLExec with PRIMA plugin has been incorporated in VDT 1.8
- OSG sites will be encouraged to deploy it with the upcoming OSG 0.8.0 release

# gLExec monitoring

- gLExec keeps a log of all authorization requests
  - The DN and FQAN of the proxy
  - PID of the calling process
  - (Sub-)processes spawned
  - Start times and end times
- Gratia probe uses this data
  - Gives accounting the real user identity

# Summary


- Pilots are becoming a reality
  - But are introducing new problems
- Yesterday's Grid security mechanisms are not enough anymore
  - Site admins want fine grained control
  - Pilot owners want OS level protection
- gLExec can help solve the technical problems
- Fermilab experience positive,  
waiting for wide OSG deployment

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
## Pilot Security with gLExec

Backup slides

# gLExec jobs a day @ FNAL



fcdfosg1



fcdfosg2